European Unity in the Interests of Security. Split along the North-South Line

In practice, European countries responded to Russia’s war against Ukraine very differently. Reality has shown that the states in the north and east were much more determined regarding this matter than those in the south of Europe.

Differences in distributing the burden of European security break cohesion of European allies. What cultural, economic, and historical factors drive these differences? And how can individual distribution of the burden contribute to a more unified approach to the European security and support of Ukraine? Is it at all possible?

Both European alliances – the NATO and the EU – have promised repeatedly to increase investments, deepen cooperation, and provide continuous support to Kyiv, but the practical response was uneven.

Northern and Eastern Europe quickly moved to intensifying deterrence and resilience. Southern and some parts of Central Europe exercised more caution. Certain countries even doubted the need to increase defence expenditures (Spain) or were uncertain about the viability of long-term military support of Ukraine (Hungary and Slovakia).

Germany ended up between these two poles. Even though the Germans have a greater sense of urgency, they are not as fast or determined as countries of Northern or Eastern Europe when it comes to practical help.

To illustrate the division of Europe between, figuratively, the North and South, it makes sense to take a look at the Baltic countries, on the one hand, and Italy, Greece, and Spain, on the other.

The Baltic states are located at the most vulnerable part of the NATO border in close proximity to Russia and Belarus. They perceive the threat at the highest level. For them, Russia is not just a potential risk but a direct and existential threat. For example, the Lithuanian Intelligence Service describes relations with Russia as “a gray area between war and peace” characterized by espionage, sabotage, and misinformation aimed at undermining NATO's solidarity and public confidence. In 2026, the Baltic countries plan to ensure a historically high level of investments in defence. Estonia will allocate 5.1% of their GDP to it, Latvia – 4.9%, and Lithuania – 5.38%.

The unstable strategic situation led to rare agreement between governments and citizens regarding prioritizing defence. Solidarity with Ukraine strengthens this consensus even more. The Baltic countries are among the largest donors of Ukraine in Europe as per the GDP combining tangible assistance with continuous public expression of support. In 2024, 76% of Lithuanians, 70% of Latvians, and 63% of Estonians said that the EU should increase their military aid to Ukraine.

The countries of southern Europe perceive the Russian threat as something far less significant. According to Eurobarometer 2024, the percentage of respondents in these countries who considered the war in Ukraine as the main threat for the EU was much lower than the average value for Europe (with the lowest numbers in Greece and Italy – 17 and 23%, respectively, compared to the average value of 31%). Due to their geographical position and specific historical and political peculiarities, the countries of Southern Europe traditionally pursued foreign policy goals and interests that did not fully coincide with the goals and interests of Central or Northern Europe.

Spain and Portugal, given their colonial past and geographical “proximity” to Latin America, are prone to look to the West rather than East. Due to its territorial disputes related to Northern Cyprus, Greece is primarily focused on the Eastern Mediterranean region. Italy traditionally focused on North Africa, Middle East, and the Balkans considering these territories as more dangerous because of illegal immigration, energy dependency, and terrorism.

The different perception of threat, to a certain degree, distanced Southern Europe from the concerns of other allies. Since 2022, NATO prioritized the deterrence on their Eastern flank, while Italy, Spain Portugal, and Greece call for paying more attention to unconventional challenges from the South.

Even though the NATO and EU are committed to strengthening the European defence potential for the continent in general by jointly investing in security and adhering to strict obligations to provide military and financial support to Ukraine, as well as helping to restore the country, some experts doubt that this will change the situation drastically. The division of Europe along the North-South line will continue. The differences between the countries representing these two camps are too great. The reforms are important, of course, but one simply cannot ignore the geographical peculiarities, historical context, and simply national character. There is too much difference between the North and South for them to ever learn to live and think identically.