Sticking Power or a Sticking Plaster? How the New Armed Forces Bill Will Affect the UK’s Preparedness for War

'Let's be really honest: it's a mess.' That was the assessment offered by UK Minister for Veterans Al Carns as he commented on the 2026 armed forces bill and the insignificant changes it makes in the British draft and mobilization system.

As Vincent Connelly and Hamish Mundell, experts of the Royal United Services Institute, write in their analytical article entitled Sticking Power or Plaster?, the bill essentially updates elements of the Reserve Forces Act 1996, developed in the aftermath of the Cold War, that is obscure and outdated now.

The new document clarifies aspects of reserve service across regular and volunteer components and reforms the legal basis for recalling them. It changes the legal trigger for recall to include ‘warlike operations’ rather than solely a hypothetical ‘actual attack' on the United Kingdom. Interestingly, Britain has never called out reserves after 1939.

The bill also raises the maximum recall age for other ranks to 65, aligning them more closely with officers, who have long held recall liability for life. Other ranks are currently liable for recall till the age of 55 – much lower than in other NATO countries most of which have has extended recall liability to the age of 65, and e.g. France, to as high as 72.

The authors believe the 2026 bill to improve manning flexibility for the armed forces. But flexibility is not the same as capability.

The extension of reserve callout fails to answer the fundamental question of how Britain will manage a protracted conflict. Britain has not yet released a credible plan of action for its government in case of a long war.

The changed conditions for reservists fall short of turning them into a veritable combat-ready army, and many nations understand it. Thus, France and Canada are doubling their reserve forces and expenditures on them till 2030.

On the other hand, the reserve component of the British armed forces is clearly declining and stagnating. It is an open secret that too many reservists needed that status simply to extend their annual leave and make informal arrangements with employers about indulgences on their main job. And the direct level of combat training undergone intermittently outside their main working hours has remained extremely low.

That is a significant constraint on the collective training of reservists that weakens their integration with regular forces - ultimately to lower their survivability in any actual hostilities and undermine the strategic combat readiness of Britain’s 25,000-strong reserve force.

The bill fails to alter the existing system. It reflects the British authorities’ reluctance to use lawful methods and State powers to support their defense system. Notably, other NATO countries are far more determined in this respect. For example, Norway and France recently reminded businesses and citizens of the State’s authority to requisition any private property in wartime. These measures rest on a clear social contract: national defense is a collective responsibility.

The 2026 Armed Forces Bill ultimately avoids the central question of preparedness: whether the State can draw real and proportionate support from society to create a real military capability.

The answer is clear to many. No, the United Kingdom is not ready for that, as it keeps clutching at the straw of liberal freedom and stays captive to the democratic chimera. By choosing caution where a hard hand is needed, the bill improves manning flexibility but falls short of raising the armed forces’ actual strength and fighting capability It offers a sticking plaster patch where a firm fist and a really massive army are needed, as the article’s title suggests.

Again, this is understood by Britain’s NATO neighbors. For example, Germany is switching to ‘voluntary’ conscription that may turn compulsory at any time, without extra delays. But London keeps ignoring the obvious for some reason.